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National health program legislation has been becalmed in the Congress for almost 80 years.
Despite periodic cries of "crisis," legislation never emerges from committee. Periodically,
campaigns have been mounted without success. Tactical efforts to circumvent direct action by
legislating bits and pieces of related programs, Medicare and Medicaid, health maintenance
organization support, and pre-budgeting, have complicated operation of the medical care
system and stimulated intractable cost inflation.
For the first 150 years of American history, responsibility for public health and welfare
legislation restedwith the states. Most public health policiesoriginated in a state or a few states
and then later became national legislation. The state efforts were, in effect, natural experi-
ments. After the Depression and the flood of funding from the federal government in
subsequent years, the states faded as innovators.
It is proposed that funding a few state models to restimulate state initiative in this regardwill
provide a more effective route to a national health program.
INTRODUCTION
In the long debate over the past 80 years on the need for a national health
program, three issues have emerged as crucial elements for consideration. One is
how to achieve equity for the population; that is, reasonably equal access to modern
medical care. The second, much more prominent today, is how to achieve this goal at
a cost to individuals and society that is acceptable and fair. Finally, the matter ofthe
quality of the medical services provided has, in recent years, acquired importance,
especially in regard to the issue of medical malpractice, its costs, and its effect on
medical practice.
These problems did notjust come to public attention, nor are theyrestricted to the
United States. Most industrialized countries have had to deal with the issues and
attempted to control cost and improve access to medical care with a national health
insurance scheme. Great Britain alone ofthe Western European nations beganwith
a tax-supported system ofguaranteed services rather than insurance. In this century,
the United States alone has failed to resolve the controversy as towhether or not the
federal government should undertake a national health program. Not only that, but,
during these years, the public has been exposed to contradictory arguments over how
such a system is to be funded and administered, ifit were to come intobeing.
Within the past few decades, however, public argument over the topic has become
more sharply focused, with the financial aspects at the forefront of the discussion.
Uncontrollable inflation ofcosts, awidening gap between services available to those
insured and those uninsured against the costs ofmedical care, alongwith an increase
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in the number of individuals and families without health insurance have served to
center the debate on insurance coverage and cost-control measures. There is a
growing consensus that the fiscal situation demands that the United States legislate a
national health care plan. While opinions differ as to how this aim is to be
accomplished, all the participants agree that the appropriate venue for resolution is
in the United States Congress.
It is certainly true that if the nation is to be served, it must be with national
legislation. But it is not so clear that the only, or appropriate approach is through the
Congress directly. For the first 150 years of American history, the traditional
American response to community welfare and health needs was for the states to
establish the pattern and the federal government to follow. Poverty and the lack of
access to medical care were not considered national issues. The Constitution
supported this view. In the federalist system of shared responsibilities, the guiding
principle is the Tenth Amendment, that "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Health matters are not delegated to the federal
government in the Constitution. During this period, local and state governments,
close to the site of established needs and difficulties, designed the programs and
assumed legislative priority.
In the nineteenth century, after the Civil War clarified the idea of national
citizenship, and advances in transportation and communication united the states
more firmly into a nation, state initiatives began to influence national legislation.
States provided the models for the pertinent sections of the 1935 Social Security Act,
the 1965 Medicaid program, the 1972 Supplemental Security Income Program, and
scores of early public health measures [1]. It was in Wisconsin and Michigan, in
Illinois and Massachusetts that measures were first adopted for support of poor
women and children, for the elderly and the blind, decades before the Social Security
Act. Pensions and unemployment compensation were state initiatives long before
they became federal laws. Hard rock miners compelled western states to pass
occupational health and safety ordinances 50 years before the federal government
passed such laws [2]. The Sheppard-Towner child health legislation in 1921 was built
on the model of earlier Connecticut law. The American Public Health Association
lists dozens of "firsts," in which states legislated public health matters long before
the federal government was involved, laws which became the pattern for federal laws
or regulations [3].
Today, as resentment grows over the sluggish responsiveness and impersonality of
a distant bureaucracy, it is increasingly argued that social concerns should be
responded to where the needs are felt first and most strongly. And, of course, it may
be more prudent to try out new approaches to health care delivery in a few states in
advance of attempting a national program. It is more reasonable to introduce an
experimental program for a few million people, and find out the flaws, than to try it
immediately on 250 million. "Common sense suggests trying the program on a small
scale to gain advance knowledge about effects on incentives" [4]. In some instances,
it may even be easier and more manageable for states to respond to their more
circumscribed issues.
Justice Brandeis, in a famous dissent, noted that "[i]t is one ofthe happyincidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
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as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country" [5].
It may not be amiss, therefore, to propose, instead of concentrating all our efforts
on Congress as the sole vehicle for establishing a national health program, that some
attention be paid to the possibility of a state initiative in that regard. The recommen-
dation for a state rather than a federal initiative, as the desirable and feasible
preliminary to a comprehensive, universal national health program, requires appreci-
ation of the background of state initiative in earlier health legislation in this country.
To a generation accustomed to look to Washington for such action, and to whom the
traditional view of state legislatures is that they are corrupt, incompetent, and
discriminatory, such historic review is essential.
Federalism, in its delineation of separate roles and functions for the states and the
national government, was much admired by early observers of the American scene,
such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord Bryce in the nineteenth century. Many
distinguished political scientists more recently have pointed out, as Kaufman does,
that "The evolution of the American system has been profoundly influenced by the
doctrine that the states are the source of authority from which all other governments
are derived" [6]. Once governor of New York, and then Vice President ofthe United
States, Nelson Rockefeller, commented on the fact that state initiatives preceded
New Deal legislation. He remarked that "It is also important to note .. that those
elements of the New Deal which failed, were largely in areas not tested by prior
experience at the state level" [7].
We naturally turn to Washington for help, these days, because for over 50 years
national legislation has controlled the financing and the scope of health and welfare,
overshadowing the states' role. The major intrusion of the national government into
health services-largely financial initiatives toward structural reform-resulted from
necessary national involvement at the time ofthe Depression. The needs were great;
the capabilities ofthe states clearly inadequate; national action was the only solution.
But the increasingly massive financial investment by the federal government over the
past 50 years has undermined and weakened state initiatives.
The notion of federalism as a philosophy of shared powers, of cooperative efforts
by the state and the federal government, and that the absence of either partner is a
fatal blow to the national purpose has been erased, in the overwhelming federal role
since the 1930s. Even so, we continue to see some health legislation arising in the
states. Before Medicare became law, and years before the inflation that followed its
passage stimulated regulatory health legislation, the Folsom Law regulated capital
expenditures of hospitals and nursing homes in New York in 1964 [8]. Perhaps we
should pursue the concept of state initiative more vigorously.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Because the problems of obtaining medical care are not new nor suddenly
perceived developments, there is a history of social efforts to deal with them.
Concern with the economic consequences of medical care costs on American
families, for example, antedates World War I. The first stirrings of social activism, an
effort to nationalize the medical care system by introducing an insurance system for
ameliorating the economic impact of illness, began in 1907, under the auspices of the
American Association for Labor Legislation. The tide of Progressivism, unionism,
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and drive toward socialwelfare prescriptionswas cut shortbyAmerica's involvement
in the first World War [9].
After the war, the American roller coaster ride of enormous wealth in the 1920s
dampened enthusiasm forwelfare legislation. Social reform and social welfare goals
did not altogether disappear, however, and the Depression in the 1930s aroused
renewed interest and fervor. In the background, the liberal agenda had continued in
health-related studies and women's interest-group agitation. In 1922, a powerful
coalition of women social reformers had succeeded in obtaining a federal law to
stimulate state programs for social and medical assistance to pregnant women and
infants [10].
The Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, in 1932, focused
attention on the fact that, in addition to economic barriers, there were inadequacies,
deficiencies, and inequities in the medical care system that required attention and
repair [11].
By this time, avarietyofother efforts had been undertaken in the hope ofbringing
the loosely organized, private and entrepreneurial American medical care system
into the public domain. Anumber ofstates had made unsuccessful efforts to legislate
universal (statewide) comprehensive health insurance programs [12]. State legisla-
tors were cautious of the tax implications and were wary ofwriting blank checks for
the medical profession. It should be kept in mind that, before 1935, there was no
strong tradition offederal grant programs to support state initiatives.
Some physicians, cooperatives, andcommunitygroups didbegin toorganize group
practices for improvement of access to modern medical care and to spread the risks
of unanticipated expenditures for that care. As the Depression's effect lengthened,
the federal government was drawn intoprovision ofpayment for medical care for the
indigent [13]. The rural population, less well supplied with medical services to start
with, sought and obtained even more public support, in the formofmodel demonstra-
tions ofpublicly supported, organized, medical care schemes [14].
Trade unions, which in the early days had opposed national health legislation as
preemptive of union responsibilities and interference into the labor/employer
negotiating process, began to champion national health insurance. The legislative
drive for the Social Security Act both supported and undermined the efforts to
obtain a national health program. President Roosevelt waspersuadedby his congres-
sional advisors andbymedical professionals close to him that antagonizingAmerican
doctors by placing a national health program within the orbit of the Social Security
Bill would doom the possibility of passage. So it was left out, with the promise that
separate legislation would follow [15]. The looming involvement in World War II in
the late 1930s deferred such consideration, however, as it had in the wake ofWorld
War I. Successive Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bills, from 1943 on, encouraged debate,
but not legislation.
There was a brief period, during World War II, when the federal government
supported large-scale medical care services in the Emergency Maternity and Infancy
Care Act, but it was abandoned immediately after the war. The persistent women's
lobby, which had succeeded in obtaining federal underpinning for children's health
programs in the Title V section of the Social Security Act, was not able to maintain
the momentum after World War II.
After World War II, America was again awash in affluence and a dream of
abundance for all, so that social and welfare legislation was slighted. The stubborn
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reformers had to content themselves with pushing bits and pieces of legislation that
would appeal to interest groups. President Truman's national health insurance
proposals, embodied in the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill modifications, never got
beyond committee hearings. The focus shifted to efforts to obtain constituent
elements, fragments that could be united eventually into a national program.
So we struggled from the Forand Bill in 1949 to Medicare in 1965. In 1950, the
disabled were added to social security beneficiaries. Kerr-Mills in 1960 gave rise to
Medicaid in 1965. Federal employees were given support for health insurance in
1959; relatives of those in the armed forces were given the same support in 1966.
Organizational efforts were promoted through the comprehensive health planning
and regional medical programs in 1965. Health personnel development received
federal support, from 1943 in the Nurse Training Act, through medical student
support, beginning in 1963.
Medicare and Medicaid, alongwith the lavish federal support for medical schools,
produced not unexpected side effects. The inflation of medical care costs had
profound influence on the Congress because of the tax implications. Between 1960
and 1970, not only did the total expenditure for medical care skyrocket, but federal
contributions to those expenditures exploded [16]. Congress now had to explore
control measures. Since 1970, the preoccupation has been cost control, not access or
equity.
The efforts at cost control: planning, regulatory measures, payment ceilings,
promotionofprepaidgrouppractice, professional reviews, diagnostic-related groups,
have not had any success. Inflation has far outstripped federal capability to control
expenditures. The combination of lack of access to medical care for millions of
Americans, with an unmanageable inflation of costs, fuels a drive toward a national
health program.
Blendon and Taylor conclude that "In the public's mind, it is clear that America
has now exhausted all the other possibilities" [17]. Industry, the major purchaser of
health insurance, finds itself at a marketing disadvantage because ofthe high, rising,
and uncontrollable costs of health insurance premiums. Physicians, through their
national organization and in ad hoc clusters as well, seem to have agreed that it is
time for a national program [18].
THE ISSUES
The pressures on Congress, professional groups such as the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the American Hospital Association, and the health care
insurance companies are directed toward developing a legislative package that will
ameliorate the suffering of the underserved, provide coverage for the uninsured,
control costs, and satisfy doctors and hospitals without huge tax increases or
intolerable additional wage assessments.
Physicians are sullen and discontented under the burden of regulations and
constraints that seriously impede their flexibility and ability to utilize professional
judgment freely. Patients are angry with inflated costs, rising insurance premiums,
and various impediments and obstacles to maintaining a comfortable, friendly
relationship with doctors. Other patients are unable to obtain needed medical
services to the extent required, or at all. Critics and reformers attack the medical
profession as greedy, uncaring, and even incompetent. Malpractice accusations
proliferate, and costs andjudgments soar.
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The political pot keeps boiling as bill after bill is introduced in the Congress to
correct the defects and resolve the issues. Solutions flow from avariety ofsources-
political, professional, academic, and socialreform-eachwithlittle ornoinputfrom
the other. As in ethnic conflicts in some geographic areas ofthe world, patients and
doctors have been antagonists rather than allies in an effort to correct and redeem
thevalues both seek.
In the past, physicians have displayed little leadership in positive proposals,
although recentlytheyhavebeenmore forthcoming. Medical schools donot domuch
toprepare theirgraduates forthe social concerns associatedwithmedicalpractice. A
distinguished British physician once compared this circumstance to the Church
preparingmissionaries for their role in the field, by instructing them on every aspect
ofthe behavioroftheirprospective constituencies except theiroccasional urge to eat
missionaries.
Lee Goldman, Harvard cardiologist, notes that efforts to stimulate physicians into
more appropriate and economical use of laboratory tests had no lasting effect. He
commented that ". . . we as a profession should complain less about the difficulty of
alteringpatients' behavior and learn more about how to change our own. . ." [19].
Patients too are reluctant tochangeoldways in seekingorpayingformedical care.
Although prepaid group practice offers significant advantages in access, cost, and
quality, after 50 years of experience, fewer than 25 percent of Americans buy into
group practices. There is abundant evidence ofthis kind ofconservatism, a cautious
resistance to change, in historic failures to adopt or to reject healing procedures.
Ackerknecht noted that, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, amputations in the
fieldwithout anesthesia were still the rule, though ether had been effectivelyutilized
for that purpose by Long in 1842 and Morton in 1846. On the other hand, the
negative effect ofbleeding as a therapeutic measure was described in 1830, but the
practice itselfcontinued well into the twentieth century [20].
The use ofcitrus as apreventive against scurvyonlongseavoyageswasestablished
experimentally by Captain James Lancaster of the British Navy in 1601; by Captain
James Lind, also of the British Navy, in 1747, but was not adopted into general
practice in the British Navy until 1795, or into the merchant navy until 1865 [21].
On the other side, in amusing counterpoint, it should be noted that "QWERTY,"
the arrangement of the letters on the standard typewriter (and computer) keyboard
was developed in 1873, to slow typists down and so keep the keys from tangling! As
the machines improved and typists began to use two hands, this antiquated
"QWERTY" keyboard became an obstacle: harder to learn and harder to use. In
1932, August Dvorak developed a keyboard adjusted to the new situation, yet it is
almost impossible to find a typewriter or computerwith such an efficient keyboard in
the shops today [22].
Perhaps we cannot expect ideas for human betterment to be translated into
acceptance at the same speed with which dress fashions and popular music race
around the world. The development of a national medical care program must take
into account thecautious conservatism ofphysicians andpublicresistance tochange.
The proposals for national health programs are closely allied to economic concerns,
but often with little regard forpatient care considerations.
CURRENT PROPOSALS
The current proposals for national health program planning emphasize one or
another of the salient issues: cost; paymentfor services, including mechanisms for
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insuring the uninsured; or enlarging access, generally through additional funding. No
proposal under serious consideration begins with the policy concern of guaranteed
services to all citizens [23].
The lack of consideration for the interrelated effects of apparently independent
legislative action is notable in the recent effort at cost control. This isolated
legislative approach mandated hospital pre-budgeting and has had the effect of
worsening patient care, by stimulating hasty discharge ofvery sick patients [24].
The American Medical Association proposed, first, simply extending Medicaid but
has moved on to adding legislation for broader work-related health insurance, for
improving access. Still, the AMA is cautiously more voluntary than compulsory
insurance-related and does not deal with cost or quality control in their recommen-
dations [25].
The Pepper Commission, a congressionally organized group, addresses itself
entirely to improving the insurance aspect and to assuring that most Americans will
be covered by work-related, or expanded Medicare and Medicaid insurance. While
its proposal contains references to quality and cost control, the specifics are lacking,
and the language is not encouraging: "recommends private and public initiative"
[26].
Alan Enthoven hopes to improve access, quality, and cost control by augmenting
work-related insurance and investing in wide-scale group practice. This approach
minimizes the possibility ofcost control and does nothing to guarantee access for the
marginally poor and uninsured [27].
It is becoming fashionable to propose an American version ofthe Canadian health
care system. The best known ofsuch proposals is that of the Physicians for a National
Health Program, who propose a "single, comprehensive public insurance program,"
in which the present sources ofpayment would flow into a single public fund; put the
doctors and hospitals on an annual budget for operations; and allow physicians to
select payment either on fee-for-service, based on a mandatory national fee sched-
ule, or by capitation and salaries [28].
It ought to be pointed out that the Canadian system didn't spring fully armed from
the brain of the Canadian Parliament. There was a ten-year lag between the
establishment of the first universal health program in the province of Saskatchewan,
and the legislation of a country-wide health program by the Canadian Parliament.
There is a legitimate question as to the applicability of an unmodified Canadian
plan. United States citizens do not behave like Canadians in a number ofways, most
notably in their political acceptance of government's role in social action and its
intervention in family matters. Will Americans accept the queuing and delays in
elective surgery characteristic of the Canadian medical services? True, for the poor
and uninsured in the U.S.A., that is routine now. But what of the other 85 percent of
the population? The Canadian city of Windsor, Ontario, across the river from
Detroit, Michigan, had a comprehensive health insurance plan in operation from the
early 1930s. The two cities are similar in many ways-auto manufacturing, the auto
workers' unions negotiating health benefits-but the Detroit auto workers never
adopted the comprehensive health insurance program of the Windsor auto workers.
What we might do, ifwe are so inclined, after examining the bugs and glitches in
the Canadian system, is to use their model as a basis for an American model, improve
on it, and avoid their mistakes!
Others look abroad for a pattern of improvement, to Britain, the Netherlands, or
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Germany [29]. While adoption ofa modified Canadian model ispossible, it is far less
likelythat the conservative streak in Americanpolitics, usuallycoupledwith akind of
nativism, would allow easy and swift adoption ofa foreign medical care program.
PLANNING FOR A NATIONAL PROGRAM BY WAY OF THE STATES
Despite thevigorous recommendations and demandsforchange, itisdoubtfulthat
federal legislation is imminent. We've spent nearly a century in a fruitless effort to
legislate a national health program for the United States. We've tried a frontal
assault in Washington almost annually since 1939. We've tried flanking attacks,
resulting in dozens of bits and pieces of legislation and regulation, in the hope that
the pieces would eventually bejoined in an edifice. Instead, the effect seems to have
been to confound the issues and set us back in costs, increase inflation, and diminish
access. Since the subject ofnational health insurance has been broached, it has been
subjected to limitless discussion, debate, and defiance, but not to legislative action. I
am reminded of the acid comments of a British professor of social medicine, that
"both parties practice a form of political contraception, in which no matter how
suggestive the preliminary movements, there are no embarrassing legislative
consequences."
In short, none ofthe proposals seems tobe anycloserto resolution in the Congress
than they have been foryears. Ifthere is not tobe, or at least notyet, a congressional
legislative mandate, what then? Historic evidence makes stimulation of state initia-
tive in this regard a promising approach to a national health care program. Many
states are alreadyengaged in avarietyofexperimental approaches to meet their own
needs: extendingMedicaid, compellingemployers tobuyinsurance for their employ-
ees. Adozen ormore states arediscussingplansforimprovingand extendingmedical
care services. California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan,
Missouri, and Washington are preparing initiatives [30]. The National Governors'
Conference has had this subject on the agenda in 1990 and 1991.
In Massachusetts, the legislature passed a compulsory insurance law in 1989, but
has as yet been unable to fund it. Hawaii passed a compulsory insurance law in 1974,
but only after long judicial delays was the state able to put the law into effect. It
provides for three channels of insurance, not a single-payer system, but has been
successful in reducing costs, to some extent. Oregon has been notable in the public
exercise ofdebate on a rationing system for controlling the costs ofmedical care, but
only for the poor at first [31].
Given the straitened circumstances of the states, and the unpredictable costs of
experimentingwith a new and asyet untried program, ifatrulycomprehensive model
for a national health program is to be generated by a state, that state will need
federal financial support. With such underwriting, the federal government could put
out what are essentially, "Request for Proposals," as it does for other experimental
programs. There would need to be conditions, "specifications," because, after all,
this plan is to be the template for a national program.
Federal encouragement of other kinds will be needed as well. For example, the
ability ofthe states to innovate is contingent upon receivingwaivers to use their share of
Medicare and Medicaid funds in new ways, and to allow abargaining agent to negotiate
fees forphysicians. Special federal regulations maybe required to handle reimburse-
ment across state lines, for people who routinely receive care in a neighboring state.
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This theoretical plan is not to suggest that the appropriate response tothe need for
a national health policy requires a painfully slow state-by-state progression toward
that goal. "State initiative" is not intended to create a national medical care program
piece bypiece. Such an effortwould be self-defeating, since itwould only add further
fragmentation, discordance, and inequities to an already unsatisfactory national
picture. The federal role must be collaborative, utilizing state initiatives for initial
developments of an anticipated equitable national system of medical care delivery.
Not only should the projected state programs be consistent with national goals, but the
federalgovernmentmustbe asecurepartnerinthe approachandtheeventualoperations.
To encourage state initiative in developing a comprehensive, statewide, universal
medical care program, the federal government should make incentive grants avail-
able to states that propose to design such programs. American pluralism suggests
that more than one state initiative should be encouraged. When the Congress turns
to designing a national program, it will have the benefit of the various state
experiences. Schultze haswrittenof"market analogues"-publicfundingofcompet-
ing public programs, in order to allow selection of the one that is most efficient,
economical, and satisfactory-multiple state experimentation would permit such
encouragement [32].
Insofar as the state initiative is to be generated on behalfofthe eventual national
solution,the federalgovernmentinits"specifications" shouldrequirethe demonstra-
tion projects to meet basic conditions that will reinforce the national requirements:
Each subsidized state initiative ought to guarantee universal coverage, comprehen-
sive benefits, a single public payer, global budgeting, and quality assurance.
The proposal does take into account the various necessary conditions for an
improved medical care service. It offers a guarantee of access, in that the entire
population is included; it has more regulatory oversight for cost savings; and it
presents an opportunity for quality control via the reporting to a central payer. It
attacks, but does not interfere too heavilywith, the status quo and therefore does not
antagonize current professionalbeneficiaries. From cost estimates ofcomprehensive
services of this kind, and reduced costs of improved administration, an incentive
grant from the federal government would be in the neighborhood of$200 million for
each million people to be served.
The states would be encouraged to experiment with forms of organization,
reimbursement, and administration. But the basic conditions would involve equal
access for all citizens to comprehensive services and universal eligibility. Local
communities would be expected to participate in policy planning, operational
controls, and funding. States would also be encouraged to experiment with program
design, particularly in administrative decision making-how patients and physicians
operate as a "team," allocation of local resources (such as hospital beds), and the
need to take into account small-area variations in the utilization ofprocedures. The
conjoint leadership ofhealth professionals with consumers should be cultivated. An
excellent existing model of a well-functioning "team" relationship ofthis kind exists
in the quality assurance department in operation at Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound, the nation's largest consumer-governed health care organization and
third largest prepaid group medical practice [33]. One of the keys to their success is
that health professionals, rather than insurance billing departments, lead the efforts
to improve the quality of care [34].
Not the least of the benefits achieved by the process could be a newrelationship of
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the medical care system to patients, to wipe out the hard economic facade that has
been medicine's countenance for manyyears now. This change would mean not only
provision of more sympathetic and personal care, but more evidence of concern by
professional caregivers, in the doctors' offices and in the hospitals for solicitous,
prompt, and competent medical services and elimination of the carelessness associ-
ated with poor or inept diagnosis and treatment, thoughtlessness, and neglect.
In short, the growing recognition ofthe need for a national health plan compels us
to seek the surest and most effective route to that end. Eighty years of unsuccessful
maneuvering at the congressional level hardly reassures us that the congressional
route is the way to go. The traditional pathway to important national social legis-
lation is through the states. At least part ofthe delay in legislating a national health
program in the United States may be attributed to the lack ofgood state models for
the nation to emulate. The route to anational health programmaywellwind through
the states.
The states themselves are beginning to look about for a resolution in those terms.
A shared program offederal, state, and local public financing, as suggested here, in
an appropriate organizational design appears promising. With federal stimulus in
the form of financial underpinning, selected states should be encouraged to under-
take experiments infashioning individual plans. The correction offlaws and deficien-
cies discovered in the operation of these state plans would provide the structural
basis for an eventual federal program.
There may be dissent from those who seek immediate federal action, and who
argue that the "principle" of national purpose demands national action. Wilbur
Cohen, onetime SecretaryoftheDepartment ofHealth, Education andWelfare, had
an amusing and insightful response to arguments of procedure "on principle." He
would say, "Sometimes we have to give up our principles and dowhat's right."
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